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being almost riskless which in turn reduces the overall lemons discount that buyers demand. In order to create a large share of safe securities from a pool of very risky assets the issuer of a typical CLO needs to enhance the creditworthiness of the most senior tranches of the deal. We illustrate the credit enhancement mechanisms in CLOs using a representative deal in the next subsection. Table 1 illustrates the sources of credit enhancement in CLOs and the transformation of B-rated loans into AAA securities using a representative deal from our sample, Octagon Investment Partners V Ltd. Octagon Investment Partners V was a $300 million deal that closed on January 14, 2003, with a portfolio consisting primarily non-investment grade loans and a limited amount of high-yield bonds and structured finance securities. 5 The weighted-average rating of the underlying collateral is BBÀ. The CLO financed the purchase of these assets with a mix of tranched liabilities: out of which 79% is AAA, 7% A, 5% BBB, 2% BB, and 8% unrated. There are several sources of credit enhancement in CLO structures, which support the creation of investment grade claims backed by speculative grade assets: (a) diversification, (b) overcollateralization and subordination, (c) excess spread, and (d) the active management of the pool. The collateral guidelines of Octagon V indicate that the manager must maintain a minimum level of diversification in his portfolio. The maximum allowable concentration in securities from a single issuer is 2% ($6 million). 6 When losses do occur, investors in the higher-rated tranches are insulated from loss by the tranches subordinate to them. All of the rated noteholders benefit from the 'overcollateralization' provided by the equity tranche. Octagon V purchased assets with an aggregate principal balance of $300 million, issuing $276.75 million worth of rated notes. The difference, $23.25 million (8%) of the asset purchase, was financed by equity investors in the deal, who receive payments from interest and principal cash flows only after rated noteholders have been paid. Additionally, investors in the senior tranches of Octagon V are protected from loss by the mezzanine tranches of the deal. In Octagon V, 21% of the capital structure serves as a cushion against loss for those investors. In cash-flow CLOs, subordination is achieved by distributing cash flows from the assets to investors in order of seniority. Panels C and D of Table 1 show the 'waterfalls' that govern how interest and principal cash flows from the collateral are allocated to investors in the deal. After taxes and administrative fees have been paid, interest receipts are used to pay CLO investors in the most senior class, A. As long as par coverage and interest coverage ratios meet their required levels (specified in the CLO indenture), interest flows down the capital structure to the next most senior class, B.
CLO structure and credit enhancement: a representative deal
7 If the ratios are not met, proceeds must be used to pay down class A, and restore compliance before subordinate investors receive any payments. Preferred shareholders collect the residual interest after all the classes senior to them have been paid. In Octagon V, the manager has an incentive to make sure that the equityholders will receive a minimum IRR of 14% because his incentive fee is conditional on it. 8 Another source of credit enhancement is excess spread. The weighted-average spread on a CLO's assets typically exceeds the weighted-average spread on its liabilities. In Octagon V, the weighted-average spread on the assets expected at the time 8 Not all structures have this feature. Another common setup is, after the interest-paying classes have been paid, the manager takes 50% of the residual as an incentive fee and the rest goes to equity. If payment date is a redemption date, the redemption prices of all the notes and any preference shares to be redeemed. If payment date requires a special redemption, pay sequentially A, then B then C then D, until each note is paid in full as required. If payment date requires a partial redemption, pay pro rata to class A, B, C, and D notes and the preference shares 3
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During the reinvestment period to purchase additional collateral 4
After the reinvestment period, pay down class A notes until paid in full 5
After the reinvestment period, pay down class B notes until paid in full 6
After the reinvestment period, pay down class C notes until paid in full 7
After the reinvestment period, pay down class D notes until paid in full 8
After the reinvestment period, to the payment of (17) Panel F: Sale and reinvestment of collateral restrictions The transaction structure permits the collateral manager to sell collateral debt securities under the following conditions:
The collateral debt security is a defaulted security, a workout asset, or a current pay obligation The collateral debt security is an equity security The collateral debt security is deemed a credit risk security The collateral debt security is deemed a credit-improved security the portfolio is fully ramped is 3.125% 9 (Table 1 , Panel E) while the weighted-average spread on its liabilities is 87 basis points (Table 1 , Panel A). Expected excess spread at the time of deal close is 2.26%. The deal requires the manager to maintain a minimum weighted-average spread on assets of 2.75%, or excess spread of at least 1.88%. Octagon V, like most CLOs, is a revolving deal. The notes issued by the CLO mature in November 2014. For the first 5 years of the deal (the 'reinvestment period'), the manager may use principal proceeds to reinvest in additional assets; after the reinvestment period, proceeds must be used to pay down notes. During the reinvestment period, the manager may also engage in limited trading, under certain conditions (Table 1 , Panel F). Octagon V's manager can trade assets that decline or improve in credit quality and may also make discretionary sales, as long as those sales do not exceed 25% of the aggregate principal balance of the portfolio. 10 After sales and purchases, the issuer must run Standard & Poor's CDO Monitor to confirm that the portfolio satisfies coverage tests (overcollateralization and interest coverage limits by tranche) and collateral quality tests (portfolio concentration limits, weighted-average spread tests, etc.). If, at any point, overcollateralization or interest coverage tests are not satisfied, investors in the rated notes may force redemption in order of seniority. Octagon V also provides the issuer with the option to redeem the notes in full after a 3-year non-call period, subject to the approval of more than 50% of the preferred shareholders. broken down by type of structure and by issuer motivation. There are three main types of CDO structures: (i) cash flow, (ii) synthetic, and (iii) market value. Cash-flow structures are the most common (74%), with synthetic (14%) and market-value (10%) structures accounting for a much smaller share of issuance. A cash-flow CDO issues notes to investors and uses the proceeds to invest in primary financial assets such as loans, mortgages, bonds, etc. As interest and principal are generated by the underlying collateral, proceeds are distributed to the CDO investors in a pre-specified way, in order of seniority. In contrast, synthetic CDOs obtain their credit exposure through derivatives contracts instead of assets purchases. A synthetic CDO issues notes to investors, invests the proceeds in risk-free securities, and enters into a series of credit default swaps (selling protection). Investors in a synthetic CDO receive periodic payments from swap premiums, and their principal is written down if the reference entities on the swaps default. 12 Market-value CDOs account for a growing share of the market. They are similar to cash-flow CDOs except the amount of liabilities the CDO can issue is determined by advance rates for each asset in the pool and collateral is marked-to-market frequently. When the liabilities outstanding exceed the advance rates, the manager must sell collateral and pay down notes until compliance is restored. While cash-flow CDOs can alter the credits in their collateral pools, trading is less frequent in cash-flow CDOs than in a market-value CDO.
Collateralized debt obligation types and issuer motivation
13 Table 2 also decomposes CDO issuance by issuer motivation. 86% of CDOs issued from 2004 through the first half of 2008 were arbitrage-motivated, rather than balance-sheet motivated. Arbitrage CDOs are typically sponsored by an investment manager or hedge fund that acquires assets on the open market and packages them into a CDO to earn management fees on the deal. Balance-sheet CDOs are motivated by a financial institution's desire to achieve relief from regulatory capital requirements or to free up capital for lending. Balance-sheet issuers are typically lending institutions. The arbitrage versus balance-sheet label is provided to Thomson Financial by the underwriter. We were unable to get any further details from Thomson about how the distinction is made, but an examination of the transactions labeled as balance-sheet deals by S&P reveals that these transactions typically contain assets from a single originator. The collateral debt security is subject to withholding tax As a result of an optimal redemption As a result of a rating confirmation failure on the effective date The transaction also allows the collateral manager to sell collateral debt securities outside the requirements set forth above, if the total volume of these sales does not exceed 25% of the aggregate principal balance of the collateral debt securities for a given annual period.
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Data and sample construction
Collateralized loan obligations are largely sold in private markets (registered under 144A or Reg S). Hence data on their structures is not publicly available. The SDC Platinum New Issues database tracks issuance in these markets but assembling a sample of CDOs from these data is difficult due to inconsistencies in SDC's classification of CDOs.
14 Moreover, SDC Platinum only provides information on the liability side of the CDO (the notes that have been issued), but does not contain detailed information about the underlying collateral that supports the notes.
Sample construction
We construct our sample of CLOs using Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect database, by hand-collecting micro-level data on the structure of a large sample of CLOs. The S&P data allows us to observe both the asset side and the liability side of a CLO, in addition to a host of information about the ratings decision. RatingsDirect provides real-time access to S&P's credit research and ratings for currently rated fixed income securities. At the time we gathered the data, October 2007, the database contained 3237 CLOs (1704 cash flow, 970 synthetic, and 563 market value or hybrids). We focus on cash-flow CLOs for which the collateral is primarily corporate loans. There are 744 such transactions in the database, comprising 44% of cash-flow CLOs and 23% of all CLOs by number. This is the largest single category of CDO in RatingsDirect, by number. Most cash-flow CLOs can be called or redeemed by the issuer after a 5-7-year non-call period (subject to the approval of a majority of preferred shareholders), and it is likely that many issued in the early part of the window have been. Our results do not change if we exclude these CLOs from the analysis. Additionally, since the non-call period is typically at least 5 years, we have no reason to suspect that the CLOs in our sample that were issued post-2002 are subject to any selection bias. As Table 2 demonstrates, the majority of CLOs-72% by amount, 75% by number over the whole period-are US-dollar denominated. Issuance of Euro-denominated CLOs increased over time from 20% of the dollar volume of issuance in 2002 to 36% in the first three quarters of 2007. Fig. 3 and Table 3 provide a detailed description of CLO deal structures. The average CLO in our sample has 7.3 tranches but deals range from 2 tranches to 21 tranches. Average deal sizes and tranche sizes have risen over time. In 2002, the median CLO issued securities totaling $397 million; by 2007, the median deal was $500 million. In 2002, the median tranche size was $17 million, while, in 2007, the median tranche size was $35 million. an analyst report summarizing the rating decision and the deal structure. We supplement the information from the Presale Report with data from the Current Ratings report. We also record the tranche structure in the Current rating report and check it against the structure in the analyst report. Presale Reports are typically released 2-3 days before the expected closing date of a transaction. New Issue Reports appear anytime from 1 day to 1 year after a transaction has closed (the median is 73 days after). At least one of these reports is available for 534 of the 744 cash-flow CLOs in RatingsDirect. We hand-collected data from these reports, using the New Issue Report when available, otherwise the Presale Report. One concern about Presale Reports is that they are issued prior to issue date, and may not reflect the actual collateral pool or the deal structure. To address this concern, we use the Current Ratings report, which has up-to-date information on tranche structures and ratings, to check whether actual deal structures match the ones in the Presale Reports. In 405 out of 534 CLOs (75.8%), the tranche structures are similar across the two reports alleviating concerns about the accuracy of Presale Reports. Managers of cash-flow arbitrage CDOs make money by buying assets such as loans in secondary markets, refinancing them by issuing tranches that are secured by these assets, and taking a share of the profits. Part of the cost-of-capital advantage that CLOs enjoy is due to their legal status as special-purpose entities, 18 but most of it is the result of structuring, which produces highly rated securities. As their name suggests, cash-flow arbitrage CLOs exploit credit-rating arbitrage; in the process of pooling and tranching, low-rated securities are transformed into highly rated tranches. Table 4 and Fig. 4 decompose the par value of notes issued by credit rating. In the sample as a whole, 71% of issuance is rated AAA; 5% is AA, 6% is A, 5% is BBB, 2% is BB, 0.1% is B, and 11% is NR (unrated). The composition of issuance across years is almost identical to the overall composition with a slight downward trend in the amount of AAA and an upward trend in the amount of unrated tranches over time. Table 5 presents a more detailed analysis of deal structures. We find that every CLO except one has an AAA tranche, and the median AAA tranche represents 73% of the deal's total value. Likewise, 98% of CLOs have an unrated tranche, and the median tranche, conditional on having one, comprises 8.8% of the deal. The interquartile ranges show that there is little variation in the composition of rated tranches across deals. For example, 80% of CDOs have an AA tranche and the median AA tranche represents 6% of the deal's par value. The interquartile range for the size of AA tranches is [4.7%, 7.7%]. Issuing liabilities in notched rating classes (e.g., AA+ or AAÀ) is relatively uncommon for 2000  460  401  414  519  102  400  612  2001  579  438  511  750  194  321  895  2002  372  307  397  432  72  250  482  2003  406  306  356  439  165  212  1023  2004  441  354  408  500  162  200  1107  2005  517  364  499  600  209  210  1250  2006  512  400  467  544  254  286  3000  2007  591  424  500  647  343  300  3529  Entire sample  512  400  460  557  257  200 If any back-and-forth occurs between CLO arrangers and the rating agency it probably happens before any analyst reports are issued. However, it is unlikely that such negotiations are necessary. S&P's CDO Evaluator software is distributed freely to arrangers so they know, for the most part (the rating agency may raise concerns that are outside the scope of the model, e.g., about the manager's track record), how changing the structure changes the amount of each class of rated notes that can be supported before the rating committee's review begins. 18 Not subject to capital requirements like most financial institutions and located in low-tax jurisdictions.
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every rating letter category. We also document a large degree of uniformity among cash-flow CDOs. According to Panel A of Table 6 , 63% of the CDOs in our sample had one of four major liability structures (''deal types''): 40% are {AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, NR} deals; 13% are {AAA, AA, A, BBB, NR}; 7% are {AAA, AA, A, BBBÀ, BBÀ, NR}; 4% are {AAA, A, BBB, BB, NR}. 19 The remaining 137 deals have idiosyncratic structures that appear less than 20 times each.
The uniformity of collateral restrictions
The majority of the CLOs in our sample are managed, i.e. collateral managers can engage in limited trading over the designated 'reinvestment period', typically the first 5-7 years of a 12-year CDO. 20 In managed CLOs, the credit quality of the pool is controlled by covenants in the deal that constrain the manager's asset allocation. and nature of collateral composition restrictions in our sample. These restrictions fall into a few broad categories: (1) restrictions on asset type, (2) restrictions on the fraction of near-default securities in the pool, (3) restrictions on the mix of fixed/floating rate securities and the payment frequency of the collateral, (4) diversification requirements by industry and issuer, (5) currency and domicile restrictions on collateral, and (6) rating restrictions. Conditioning on the presence of any given restriction, there is very little variation in the magnitude of the restriction. For example, nearly 70% of the CDOs in our sample requires a minimum fraction of the collateral pool be invested in senior secured loans. When this restriction is present, in 40% of the cases it takes the value of 90%, and the interquartile range is [85%, 90%]. Furthermore, 46% of CDOs restrict the amount of second lien loans as a percentage of total asset par; the median limit is 10% and the interquartile range is [10%, 12.5%]. Likewise, 60% of CDOs limit the amount of structured finance collateral as a percent of total asset par; the median limit is 5% and the interquartile range is [3%, 5%]. We find similar clustering on all other types of restrictions. According to S&P, collateral constraints ''are specified by the sponsor, banker, and collateral manager based on their perceptions of what the investor community wants and can be comfortable with'' (Global Cash Flow & Synthetic CDO Criteria, pp. 19-21). In the rating process, and as ratings are monitored during the life of the CDO, collateral restrictions only affect tranche ratings insofar as default, correlation, and recovery rates assumed for individual assets depend on asset class, rating, maturity, and domicile. (We explain the details of the rating model in Section 5.1.) That is, there is no additional penalty vis-à -vis the rating agencies for including for example more than 5% of structured finance collateral. The uniformity in collateral restrictions suggests that investors may to some extent rely on simple rules to judge the riskiness of these complex and idiosyncratic structures. Additionally, there is reason to believe that rating agencies influence investor perceptions of what constitutes an acceptable allocation of collateral. S&P's Presale and New Issue Reports have a 'Strengths, Weaknesses, and Concerns' section where they highlight collateral characteristics that they deem unusually risky; often this involves pointing out when allocations to certain baskets (e.g., rated below CCC+, structure finance securities, etc.) exceed levels seen in Table 7 .
The alchemy of CDO credit ratings
We now turn to analyze the relation between the underlying collateral quality, and the credit rating of the secured tranches. Our main measure of collateral quality is the weighted-average rating (WAR) of all the assets in the pool. The WAR is reported in the Presale Reports and is calculated as a weighted-average of all the loans, bonds, and securities in the collateral pool. S&P requires that every asset in the pool will have either an actual or assessed credit rating. One concern about weighted-average rating as a measure of collateral quality is that it does not sufficiently describe the riskiness of the collateral pools. Two portfolios with the same WAR could have very different loss distributions. Consider, for example, a portfolio that contains only B-rated securities versus a portfolio that contains some AA securities pooled together with many CCC-rated securities or near-default loans. However, based on the collateral We find that 85% of the CLOs in our sample have collateral pools with a WAR of B, 8% have a WAR of BB, and for 7% the information about WAR is missing.
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22 As Panel B of Table 6 demonstrates, we do not find any correlation between deal type and WAR of the collateral pool; each type of deal is more likely to be backed by collateral with an average rating of B than BB. It is interesting to note that there is a trend in weighted-average collateral quality over time: with BB-backed CDOs all but disappearing by 2006-2007. This deterioration in average collateral quality over time implies that debt or equity investments in later CDOs are potentially riskier. As is typical in structured finance products, there is a gap between the credit ratings on the notes issued by CDOs and the credit quality of the underlying collateral. Fig. 5 quantifies the ratings transformation that takes place in our sample of CDOs. Cash-flow CLOs finance the purchase of junk-rated assets (typically B+) largely with AAA-rated borrowings. While 70.7% of the dollar amount of CDOs in our sample was initially rated as AAA, the collateral that supports these issues had an average credit rating of B+. 
How does the CLO credit-rating model work?
In this subsection we review the process that S&P uses to determine credit ratings for CLO tranches. The rating process for cash-flow CLOs involves two steps. In the first stage, an expected loss distribution for the underlying collateral pool is estimated. In the second stage, cash-flow simulations are used to determine whether a tranche can withstand the necessary level of defaults to earn a given rating. The model requires many assumptions about default probabilities, correlation, interest rate movements, and more. The model generates two key statistics that determine the level of credit enhancement of each of the tranches in a CLO deal. The first statistic, calculated for each tranche, is S&P's 'scenario default rate' (SDR). The 'scenario default rate' is the level of default in the collateral pool that a tranche must be able to withstand to earn its rating. SDRs allow us to characterize, at least partially, the loss distribution that was estimated in the rating process for each collateral pool. The second statistic-'break-even default rate' (BEDR) indicates the level of portfolio defaults that each tranche can withstand, according to the underwriter's cash-flow models.
To estimate an expected loss distribution for a CLO's collateral, S&P uses historical data on rating transitions from its CreditPro database (1981-present) . 23 Each asset in the collateral pool is assigned an expected default probability based on asset class (corporates, ABS, sovereigns, etc.), rating, and maturity. 24 Some simple assumptions are made about default correlation. For example, two corporate securities in the same sector are assigned a 0.15 correlation; while corporate securities from different sectors obtain a correlation of 0.05. 25 Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate the distribution of portfolio losses. S&P then uses this loss distribution to generate a ''scenario default rate'' for each tranche-this is the . This figure compares the credit rating of CDO tranches with the average credit rating of the underlying collateral pools that back them. The height of the bars pertaining to the tranche ratings represents the total par value of CDO securities issued with a given rating. The height of the bars pertaining to the underlying collateral represents the total par value of the CDOs where each CDO's par value is allocated based on the weighted-average rating of the underlying collateral pool. The sum of the heights of the blue bars equals the sum of the heights of the red bars. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 23 Calculations may be based on the expected composition of the asset pool to some extent because only 50-70% is typically ramped up at the closing date. 24 According to the CDO Evaluator Technical Document, pp. 5-6, S&P calculates a 1-year transition matrix from historical data and generates predicted default rates by raising it to higher powers (Standard & Poor's, 2005a) . Appendix 1 of this document shows the 1-year transition matrix and the predicted default rates (up to 30 years). This methodology implicitly assumes that current rating is the only determinant of the likelihood of default. level of portfolio losses that a tranche must be able to withstand in cash-flow simulations to earn its rating. 26 There are two steps in calculating the SDR. First, S&P identifies the default rate on corporate bonds that have the same rating as the one being sought for the tranche and maturity equal to the weighted-average maturity of the CDO's assets (''x%''). Then, using the loss distribution generated for the collateral pool, they identify the default rate that has no greater chance of being exceeded than x%; this is the SDR. Consider a CDO tranche backed by collateral with a weighted-average maturity of 10 years that is being tested for an A rating. If the expected default rate of a 10-year A-rated corporate bond is 3%, the SDR for the tranche is set equal to the level of default in the CDO's collateral pool that has no greater than 3% chance of being exceeded. When the underwriter runs cash-flow simulations, he will test that the tranche can withstand cumulative defaults up to the SDR without missing interest or final principal payments. The logic is ''if the tranche can survive defaults up to the SDR then its probability of default is no greater than 3%, as would be appropriate for an A rating '' (Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, p. 42) .
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SDRs allow us to back out, partially, the loss distributions that were estimated for each CLO's collateral pool. For example, the loss distribution for a CLO backed by a pool of assets with a weighted-average maturity of 7 years must satisfy 27 : Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR AAA )rdefault rate of 7 years, AAA-rated corporate bond ¼ 0.14% Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR AA )rdefault rate of 7 years, AA-rated corporate bond ¼ 0.40% Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR A )rdefault rate of 7 years, A-rated corporate bond ¼ 0.96% Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR BBB )rdefault rate of 7 years, BBB-rated corporate bond ¼ 4.6% Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR BB )rdefault rate of 7 years, BB-rated corporate bond ¼ 14.1% Pr(asset defaults as % of total par4SDR B )rdefault rate of 7 years, B-rated corporate bond ¼ 32.2%. Fig. 6 illustrates the relationship between the loss distribution and SDRs. Table 8 summarizes SDRs by tranche rating for our sample. As the table shows, median SDRs by rating class are: AAA ¼ 41%, AA ¼ 37%, A ¼ 32%, BBB ¼ 26%, and BB ¼ 20%. Assuming, for simplicity, that all CDOs have assets with a weighted-average maturity equal to the sample mean (7 years), the typical CDO in our sample is backed by collateral that has an expected loss distribution like the one below:
Pr(defaults as % of total asset par441%)r0.14% Pr(defaults as % of total asset par437%)r0.40% Pr(defaults as % of total asset par432%)r0.96% Pr(defaults as % of total asset par426%)r4.6% Pr(defaults as % of total asset par420%)r14.1%.
An AAA tranche is a tranche that can withstand the cumulative default rate that has no greater than 0.14% of being exceeded (41%). An AA tranche is one that can withstand the cumulative default rate that has no greater than 0.40% of being exceeded (37%). Clearly this methodology relies on estimating the loss distribution with a high degree of precision. Yet small changes in correlation assumptions can have dramatic effects on the right tail of the loss distribution.
CLO ratings and investor demand
Similar to many other structured finance products, most of the liabilities of CLOs are AAA rated. In the previous section we described the credit-rating model used to generate the supply of AAA tranches. In this section we suggest that to a large extent CDO structures-and, in particular, their AAA-rated tranches-are driven by investor demand, which in turn is potentially driven by rating-dependent regulation, asymmetric information, and investor guidelines and heuristics.
Rating-dependent regulation
Extensive use of credit ratings in the regulation of financial institutions created a natural clientele for CDO and CLO securities. According to Hunt (2008) capital requirements at banks, insurance companies, and broker-dealers, depend on the credit ratings of the assets on their balance sheets. 28 Pension funds, a $10 trillion source of capital in the United States, also face ratings-based regulations. A recent survey of 200 pension plan sponsors and investment managers in the US and Europe (Cantor et al., 2007) found that 75% have minimum rating requirements for bond purchases and 50% set limits on portfolio distribution by rating class. Meanwhile, modifications to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) over the past 20 years have gradually expanded the range of structured finance securities that pension funds can hold. 29 This matrix of regulation creates institutional demand for highly rated securities, yet the supply of highly rated single-name securities is fairly limited. For example, only five nonfinancial companies and a few sovereigns had AAA ratings as of 2007. Thus, it is not surprising that highly rated CDO securities, especially those that are rated AAA, are attractive to many of these financial institutions. Highly rated CDO securities incur smaller capital charges, may be used as collateral, and provide a higher yield 
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Table 8
Level of portfolio defaults that rated tranches must/can withstand in rating agency simulation model. Scenario default rate ¼ level of portfolio defaults that a tranche should be able to withstand (paying timely interest and ultimate principal by maturity) in cash-flow simulations; it is equal to the level of defaults in the collateral pool that has no greater than x% chance of being exceeded, where x% is the historical default rate on a corporate bond of the same rating and maturity as the tranche in question. Break-even default rate ¼ level of portfolio defaults that a tranche can withstand, according to underwriter cash-flow simulations. than single-name securities with the same rating. Moreover, private investors not subject to rating-based regulation, may develop internal investment rules using credit ratings as inputs even when not required by regulation to do so.
Heuristics and asymmetric information
Ratings-based regulation explains some of the demand for highly rated securities, but does not fully explain why we see so much AAA in CDO structures, as opposed to AA or A. Behavioral economics provides some insight as to why investors might demand AAA securities even in the absence of rating-dependent regulation. As described above, according to DeMarzo (2005) under asymmetric information, a CLO issuer maximizes his revenue from the sale by pooling and tranching, which results in the concentration of the default risk in few tranches. According to Demarzo's model, in order to alleviate any concerns about adverse selection in the securities issued by the CLO arranger, these securities would need to be certified as risk-free. If investors use heuristics to classify assets, as in Shleifer and Barberis (2003) , and only AAA-rated securities are perceived to be riskless then issuers would cater to investor demand by carving out large portions of their collateral pools as AAA.
Investor demand and the supply of uniform securities
While it is difficult to quantify the extent to which regulation, heuristics, or asymmetric information individually drive demand for CLO securities, the uniformity of CLO structures suggests that investor demand in general is an important determinant of their structures. Uniformity reduces the amount of time investors must spend analyzing a new deal by making it easy to identify deviations from commonly used practices. If some CLO structures have been perceived as more desirable then other issuers will follow the same convention. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the S&P rating model was known to CLO issuers and was provided to them by the rating agency. issuers to structure their CDOs to achieve the highest possible credit rating at the lowest possible cost. For example, Fig. 7 shows that one of the outputs that the CDO Evaluator provides to the issuer is ''excess collateral'' which, according to S&P, ''tells what percentage of assets notional needs to be eliminated (added) in order for the transaction to provide just enough (i.e. ROC equals to 100%) support at a given rating level. '' 30 In other words, the model provided a sensitivity analysis feature that made it easy for issuers to target the highest possible credit rating at the lowest cost.
Conclusion and thoughts about the future of the CLO market
The innovation represented by collateralized loan obligations has been instrumental to the growth of the syndicated loan market. By creating highly rated securities out of junk quality loans, CLOs have brought new investors into the loan market-rating-constrained institutions that would not be allowed to hold the non-investment grade loans directly-and helped to finance a record-breaking leveraged buyout wave from 2003 to 2007. While CLOs have not yet suffered downgrades or impairments as those experienced by asset-backed CDOs, there are some signs that the deepening recession is causing a deterioration in the quality of outstanding loans that serve as collateral for CLOs. Table 9 displays collateral performance by vintage as been reported recently by S&P. As the table demonstrates, the fraction of assets rated BB and B has declined, while the share of assets rated CCC or those in actual default (D) increased across most vintages. These changes reflect the transition of assets from BB and B ratings to CCC and D within CLOs' collateral pools as a result of the current recession and credit crisis. While most of the effect of the decline in collateral quality led to downgrades of mezzanine tranches of CLOs rather than the most senior tranches, if this trend continues, more senior tranches may be affected as well. 31 The future of CLOs as well as the resurrection of the leveraged loan market will likely be determined by the ability of CLOs to withstand corporate defaults. 30 See Rajan et al. (2008) who provide evidence that securitization led to loans with worse fundamentals due to the tendency to rely on statistical models and reduction in the incentives to collect soft information. 31 CLO managers may be required to sell defaulted loans if they violate collateral quality requirements, however secondary markets for loans have dried up as well, which may result in loan fire-sales.
